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Abstract 
 
Previous studies have shown that viewing others in pain activates cortical somatosensory 
processing areas and facilitates the detection of tactile targets. It has been suggested that such 
shared representations have evolved to enable us to better understand the actions and 
intentions of others. If this is the case, the effects of observing others in pain should be 
obtained from a range of viewing perspectives. Therefore, the current study examined the 
behavioural effects of observed grasps of painful and non-painful objects from both a 1
st
 and 
3
rd
 person perspective. Participants were faster to detect a tactile target delivered to their own 
hand in the 1
st
 person perspective when viewing painful grasping actions, compared to all 
non-painful actions. However, this effect was not revealed in the 3
rd
 person perspective. The 
combination of action and object information to predict the painful consequences of another 
person’s actions when viewed from the 1st person perspective, but not the 3rd person 
perspective, argues against a mechanism ostensibly evolved to understand the actions of 
others.  
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Can't touch this: the first-person perspective provides privileged access to 
predictions of sensory action outcomes. 
 
Viewing others perform actions (e.g., Oosterhof, Wiggett, Diedrichsen, Tipper & Downing 
2010; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), display emotions (Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, Royet, 
Gallese & Rizzolatti, 2003), encounter touch (Keysers, Wicker, Gazzola, Anton, Fogassi & 
Gallese, 2004; Bufalari, Aprile, Avenanti, Di Russo, & Aglioti, 2007) and pain (Morrison, et 
al., 2007; Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan & Frith, 2004) elicits activation of 
neuronal ensembles that are similarly recruited when we directly experience these 
phenomena. A prominent view is that these ‘shared representations’ are a product of 
specialized brain mechanisms that give people direct insights into the internal states of others 
(e.g., Ramachandran, 2000; Ramachandran & Oberman, 2008; Schütz-Bosbach, Mancini, 
Aglioti, & Haggard, 2006). On this view, shared representations have evolved as adaptations 
to the requirement of having to understand the behavior of conspecifics, and confer 
substantial adaptive advantages: they help people to empathise with one another, to 
coordinate and predict future actions, and to detect deception. Consistent with such a 
primarily social role, a large number of mirror neurons are viewpoint independent or respond 
selectively to actions from a 3
rd
 person perspective (Caggiano et al., 2011; Oosterhof, Tipper, 
& Downing, 2012), and there is increasing evidence that disrupting shared representation also 
disrupts social understanding (for review, see Avenanti, Candidi, & Urgesi, 2013).  
Recently, however, the view that shared representations evolved specifically to 
facilitate social understanding has been challenged (cf. Heyes, 2010; Brass & Heyes, 2005; 
Keysers & Perrett, 2004). These theories do not deny that shared representations are 
computed in a wide range of circumstances or that they play a crucial role in action 
   
 
 
Bach, P., Fenton-Adams, W., & Tipper, S. P. (2014). Can’t touch this: The first-person perspective provides 
privileged access to predictions of sensory action outcomes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 40(2), 457-464.  doi: 10.1037/a0035348. 
 
 
understanding and empathy. However, instead of emerging from specifically evolved brain 
systems for social understanding, shared representations are seen as (very useful) by-products 
of the processes that monitor and control the individual’s own actions (e.g., Brass & Heyes, 
2005; Heyes, 2010; Keysers & Perrett, 2004; Gallese, 2001). Prediction processes – and the 
internal models they rely on – have taken centre stage in such accounts. Humans constantly 
predict how their bodies will affect the environment, and how the environment will affect 
them (e.g., Friston, 2010; Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). These predictions allow them to 
take evasive action, make course corrections, or stop actions altogether if negative outcomes 
are expected. They emerge from sophisticated processes combining multiple sources of 
information. During reaching, for example, actors combine information about their action 
with the internal model of the goal object – its anticipated weight, softness and texture – to 
predict the specific consequences of grasping it, such that grips can be adjusted and future 
actions can be planned before contact is made (for a review, Johansson & Flanagan, 2009). 
We and others have argued that shared representations could emerge naturally from 
such prediction mechanisms (e.g., Morrison, Fenton-Adams, Tipper, & Bach, 2013; Bach, 
Bayliss, & Tipper, 2012; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; Miall, 2003; Gallese, 2001). Because 
the visual input to these mechanisms is very similar during both action and observation, the 
same integration processes can take place, and yield the same predictions of action outcomes. 
A recent study (Morrison, et al., 2013) provided initial evidence for this idea. Participants 
watched hands either grasp or withdraw from painful and non-painful objects, and judged the 
appropriateness of these actions. We tested whether observers’ tactile processing systems 
would represent the painful sensory consequences associated with grasping the painful 
object. Importantly, no direct cues to pain were shown, such as skin damage or negative 
emotional expressions. Any sensory expectation of pain could therefore not be directly 
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extracted from the stimulus, but – similar to action execution – had to be predicted by 
combining action information (whether it involves hand-object contact) with the internal 
model of the goal object (whether it is painful to touch). Indeed, we found that observers’ 
somatosensory cortices showed higher activations for painful grasps than in any other hand-
object interaction that did not cause pain, suggesting that participants indeed made such 
predictions. Moreover, subsequent psychophysical experiments revealed that seeing painful 
grasps also increased participants’ readiness to detect tactile stimulation on their own fingers, 
but not auditory stimulation. The lack of effect with auditory stimuli ruled out more general 
attention/arousal related explanations of the effects, and revealed that the predictions of 
sensory action outcomes specifically affected sensory-tactile representation systems. 
These findings show that people make sophisticated predictions about the 
outcome of others’ actions, but it remains an open issue whether these predictions 
emerge from processes evolved to enable social understanding or to enable the 
prediction of consequences for the self. The present study tests these alternative 
hypotheses, following a logic introduced by Oberman and Ramachandran (2008; for related 
approaches, see Gallese, 2001; Schütz-Bosbach, et al., 2006). It rests on the notion that a 
mechanism that has evolved for monitoring one’s own actions should be driven most directly 
by visual input that matches the 1
st
 person view one has of one’s own actions. The sensory 
consequences of others actions should therefore be derived effectively when seen from this 
1
st
 person perspective, but less so when they are seen from a 3
rd
 person view, which captures 
the typical viewpoint when watching the actions of others. The opposite pattern is predicted if 
these mechanisms are specialized for social understanding (cf. Oberman & Ramachandran, 
2008). That is, simulation of the sensory consequences of an action should be activated when 
observing the actions of another person which are typically viewed from the 3
rd
 person 
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perspective, rather than one’s own actions typically viewed from a 1st person perspective. 
Such a specialisation for the actions of others has indeed been demonstrated for the case of 
automatic imitation. Motor responses during action observation are stronger if the action is 
attributed to another person, rather than to oneself (Schütz-Bosbach, et al., 2006). 
To test these predictions, we adapted the psychophysical paradigm of Morrison et al. 
(2013). As before, participants watched hands grasp or not grasp objects that could be painful 
or non-painful and, at the same time, pressed a button whenever they felt supraliminal tactile 
stimulation on their own fingers. The readiness to detect such stimulation – measured by 
response times – when participants viewed grasps of painful objects (relative to grasps of 
neutral objects, or misses of either type) served as a measure of the extent to which 
participants inferred the sensory-tactile consequences of these actions.  
Two important changes were made to the original design. First, in the original study 
participants judged whether the actions were appropriate to the object (e.g., grasps were 
appropriate for neutral objects but not painful ones, and vice versa for withdrawals), a task 
which by itself encouraged deriving the sensory consequences of the actions. To test natural 
biases in prediction systems it is crucial to eliminate such top-down task influences and to tap 
into more automatic modes of processing. Thus, after participants were familiarized with the 
painful and non-painful objects, they merely reported whether the hand made contact with the 
object or not; whether this contact would cause pain was not task relevant.  
Second, in the original study, participants saw the actions from the side. To be able to 
manipulate the closeness of the visual input to either one’s own or other people’s actions, the 
actions were now presented from a bird’s eye perspective. This allows us to generate 1st 
person and 3
rd
 person views by simply mirroring the displays along the horizontal axis, but 
showing otherwise identical stimuli. Thus, in the 1
st
 person perspective condition, the stimuli 
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were rotated such that they matched the input one receives from one’s own actions: during 
the reach, the hand moved away from the participant towards an object, while the arm 
pointed backwards to the approximate location of the participants’ body. In contrast, in the 
3
rd
 person perspective condition, the stimuli were rotated to match the view one has of the 
action of another person. During the reach, the hand moved towards an object and the 
participant, while the arm pointed forwards, away from the participant’s body.  
This paradigm allowed us to test, first, whether observers’ tactile representation 
systems would predict the sensory consequences of grasping painful objects even when the 
nature of the object was irrelevant to the task. If this is the case, tactile stimulation should 
again be detected more quickly when viewing painful grasps, compared to any other type of 
hand-object interaction that does not cause pain (grasps of neutral objects, or misses of either 
type of object). Second, it allows us to test how viewing perspective affects these automatic 
predictions. If sensory predictions emerge from mechanisms for representing one’s own 
actions, these effects should be stronger for actions seen from the 1
st
 person compared to a 3
rd
 
person perspective. In contrast, if they emerge from a dedicated system for social 
understanding, any effects should be stronger in the 3
rd
 than the 1
st
 person perspective.  
Note that prior studies have indeed demonstrated impressive effects of 3
rd
 person 
information, such that the observer’s internal state was affected by what another person 
attempted to ignore (Frischen et al., 2009), attempted to avoid (Griffiths & Tipper, 2009), or 
by what they could see (Samson et al. 2010). However, the internal states of interest were 
typically (1) directly discernible from the visual stimulation, (2) did not require internal 
inference or combination of sources of information, or (3) were observed in tasks where 
representing the others’ perspective was encouraged by task or stimuli. Moreover, (4) none of 
these studies implemented a 1
st
 person control condition. Ours is the first study to dissociate 
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predictive and social understanding views of shared representations, where the outcome of 
more sophisticated prediction processes can be compared across perspectives. 
 
 
Method 
Participants. 48 participants (14 male, 3 left-handed) were recruited through the Bangor 
University, School of Psychology, participation panel. All were aged 18 years or over (M = 
20.23, SD = 3.14), had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were first language English 
speakers. They received course credits to compensate them for their time. The procedures 
were approved by the School of Psychology Ethics Committee, Bangor University, Wales.  
Apparatus. Visual and tactile stimuli were presented using Presentation (www.neurobs.com) 
on a 3.2 Ghz Pentium computer running Windows XP. The tactile stimulator, an Oticon 
BC462 bone conductor, was attached to the tip of the participant’s right index finger with 
adjustable tape. The stimulation was a 200 Hz sine wave, overlaid with white noise, lasting 
50 ms. The first and last 10ms were faded in and out to prevent sharp transients. Participants 
wore earplugs and ear protectors to prevent them from hearing the stimulation device.  
Stimuli. Participants viewed two-frame action sequences. Each sequence was shot from a 
birds-eye perspective and showed a hand interacting with one of 7 painful and 7 non-painful 
objects (Figure 1a). The first frame always showed a hand in a neutral position near an object 
(for 750 ms). The second frame (500 ms.) showed the same hand either grasp or miss the 
object. The two frames followed each other without a gap, creating the impression of 
apparent motion (Figure 1b).  
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Figure 1. a) Examples of object stimuli. Non-painful objects included a cable, plant, cheese 
on a wooden board, a spoon, a tomato sauce sachet, a wine glass and an orange. Painful 
objects included barbed wire, holly, a loaded mousetrap, a serrated sharp knife, a shard of 
glass, a broken wine glass and a cactus. b) Schematic of tactile detection task (4000 ms total 
trial duration). Tactile stimulation (50ms duration) occurred 150ms after the onset of the 
frame where the hand interacted with the object. The delayed verbal response occurred 
during the final frame of the trial sequence, when the question mark was on screen.  
 
Each sequence could be shown in the 1
st
 person or the 3
rd
 person perspective (Figure 2). The 
same photographs of hands and objects were used for each perspective by flipping and 
rotating the images. In the 1
st
 person perspective condition, the stimuli were rotated such that 
they matched the input one receives from one’s own actions: during the reach, the hand 
moved away from the participant towards an object. In the 3
rd
 person perspective condition, 
the stimuli were rotated to match the view one has of the action of another person. During the 
reach, the hand moved towards an object and the participant.  
In the 3
rd
 person perspective, as a between subjects factor, participants either viewed 
an anatomical match of the 1
st
 person perspective hand (i.e. a right hand in the 1
st
 person 
perspective and a right hand in the 3
rd
 person perspective) or a mirror image of the 1
st
 person 
perspective hand (i.e. a right hand in the 1
st
 person perspective and a left hand in the 3
rd
 
person perspective) (see Figure 2). This factor of no interest was included to account for 
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possible differential effects of specular and mirror image forms or 3
rd
 person perspective 
stimuli (e.g., Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of experimental conditions. Within participants: viewpoint (1
st
 person 
perspective/3
rd
 person perspective), action (contact/no contact) and object (painful/not 
painful). Between participants: 3
rd
 person mapping (mirror image/anatomical match). 
 
 
Design and Procedure. To familiarize participants with the painfulness of the objects, they 
first completed a computer-based 28-item rating scale questionnaire (see Morrison et al., 
2013). Using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all to 5 = very much), participants rated each 
of the 14 objects they would see during the experiment on how painful they imagined it 
would be to grasp the object, and to what degree they judged this from their own experience. 
To ensure participants would recognize the stimuli, a side view of the object (see 
Supplementary Figure 1) was displayed for 2000 ms. The object was then presented in the 
birds-eye view for painfulness ratings, which was the form in which it was seen throughout 
the rest of the experiment.  
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On completion of the rating scale, participants inserted the earplugs and wore ear 
protectors. Participants attached the stimulation device to their right index finger. The 
stimulation device was switched on to familiarise the participant with the tactile stimulation 
and the tactile detection task. Participants were requested to press the spacebar on the 
keyboard with their left hand as quickly as possible whenever they felt the tactile stimulation. 
The tactile target was the same as during the experiment proper.  
When the experimenter was confident the participant could perform the task correctly, 
participants completed 16 practise trials that were randomly selected from the main 
experimental trials. Participants viewed two frame sequences of a hand either approach and 
grasp, or miss, painful and non-painful objects, from a 1
st
 person perspective and 3
rd
 person 
perspective (see Figure 1 and 2). Tactile stimulation occurred 150 ms after the onset of the 
second frame (where the hand performed the action) on 80% of the trials. At the end of each 
trial, regardless of whether there was tactile stimulation or not, participants had to make a 
verbal response about whether the action involved “contact” or “no contact”. 
The experiment proper consisted of 280 trials in total and was subdivided into four 
blocks. Trials were equally distributed over the eight different conditions (object painful/non-
painful x contact/no contact x perspective), with 35 trials in each condition, 27 of which were 
trials with tactile stimulation. Each of these four blocks was preceded by a shorter block of 16 
trials that served to remind participants about the painfulness of the objects. In these blocks, 
participants saw the same actions and performed the same task but were asked whether the 
object they had seen was potentially “painful” or “not painful”.  
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Results 
Three additional participants were excluded for not performing the task correctly. One 
participant did not report whether the hand made contact but reported object painfulness 
instead. The other two did not respond in a speeded manner to the tactile stimulations (mean 
RTs > 1500 ms). Pre-emptive detections (<100ms) and reaction times greater than 1500ms 
were removed from the data (0.49%). The data for reaction times (Figure 3), hits, and false 
alarms (Figure 4) were entered into separate 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the 
factors viewpoint (1
st
/3
rd
 person perspective), action (contact/no contact) and object 
(painful/not painful) and the between groups factor of 3
rd
 person mapping (anatomical 
match/mirror image).  
Reaction Times. The analysis of reaction times (RTs, see Figure 3) revealed a main effect of 
action, F(1,46) = 58.37, p < .001, 2p = .56, and object, F(1,46) = 10.61, p = .002, 2p = .19. 
Participants detected tactile stimulation more quickly when they viewed contact compared to 
no contact, and when they viewed painful objects compared to non-painful objects. There 
was a trend towards an action by object interaction, F(1,46) = 3.64, p = .063, 2p = .07, and, 
crucially, a significant three-way interaction of viewpoint, action and object, F(1,46) = 6.14, 
p = .017, 2p = .12. No other main effects or interactions were significant (F < 1.92, for all).  
To better understand the three-way interaction, RTs in the 1
st
 and 3
rd
 person 
perspective were analysed in separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs, with the factors of action (contact/no 
contact) and object (painful/not painful). Analysis of the 1
st
 person perspective trials 
confirmed the main effects of action, F(1,47) = 52.67, p < .001, 2p = .53, and of object, 
F(1,47) = 4.75, p = .034, 2p = .09, and the critical interaction of action and object, F(1,47) = 
7.65, p = .008, 2p = .14. Indeed, planned comparisons indicated that in the 1
st
 person 
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perspective, participants responded to touch on their own fingers more quickly when seeing 
painful grasps than in any other condition (p < .002 for all), fully replicating the results of 
Morrison et al. (2013). In contrast, analysis of the 3
rd
 person perspective only revealed the 
known main effects of action (F(1,47) = 41.31, p < .001, 2p = .47) and object (F(1,47) = 
9.72, p = .003, 2p = .17), but importantly, and in contrast to the 1
st
 person perspective, no 
evidence for an interaction (F(1,47) = 0.11, p = .737, 2p < .01).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean reaction time (ms) to the detection of a tactile stimulus, whilst observing 
hands from 1
st
 person perspective (left panel) and 3
rd
 person perspective (right panel) grasp or 
miss painful and non-painful objects. Error bars represent +1SEM.  
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Please see the Supplementary material for robustness analyses of the effects and their 
sensitivity to the inclusion of the 3
rd
 person mapping factor, a signal detection analysis of the 
data, as well as an RT distribution analysis (de Jong, et al., 1994), showing that the three-way 
interaction develops from the fastest to the slowest responses. 
False Alarms. In a version of the current task using close to threshold stimulation, Morrison 
et al. (2013) reported a bias to report touch during the observation even in the absence of 
stimulation (false alarms). The current experiment was an above threshold stimulation task, 
and, as such, did not promote participants to make false alarms in the same way an 
ambiguous stimulus might. Nevertheless, to investigate whether a similar pattern existed in 
the current data, false alarms were entered into the same three-way ANOVA as the reaction 
times. False alarms were recorded when participants pressed the spacebar to report they had 
felt stimulation, when no stimulation was delivered. 
The number of false alarms (Figure 4) did not differ between viewpoint (F < 2) or 
object painfulness (F < 1), and no interaction between viewpoint and action (F < 1) was 
observed. There was no between group effect of 3
rd
 person mapping (anatomical 
match/mirror image), F(1, 46) = 1.59, p = .213, 2p = .03, and no interaction with this factor. 
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of action, F(1,46) = 17.34, p < .001, 2p = .27, such that 
more false alarms were made when participants viewed hands making contact with objects 
(M = 0.85) than when the hands missed the objects (M = 0.42). There also was an interaction 
between viewpoint and object, F(1,46) = 4.08, p = .049, 2p = .08, suggesting that the 1
st
 
person perspective generally increased the likelihood for false alarms when viewing actions 
towards painful objects, compared to non-painful objects. Numerically, this effect appeared 
to be driven by the painful grasp condition and therefore mirrored the response time data. 
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However, the relevant three-way interaction between viewpoint, action and object was not 
significant, F(1,46) = 1.04, p = .312, 2p = .02.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean number of false alarms (erroneous detections of tactile stimulation) whilst 
observing hands grasp or miss painful and non-painful objects from the 1
st
 person perspective 
(left panel) or 3
rd
 person perspective (right panel). Error bars represents +1SEM.  
 
 
Hits. Hits reflected the percentage of correctly detected stimulations. Participants detected a 
mean of 27.43 (SE = 0.14) stimulation trials out of 28. There was no between group effect of 
3
rd
 person mapping (anatomical match/mirror image), F < 1, p = .642, 2p < .01. The three-
way ANOVA revealed only one significant interaction between action and the between group 
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effect of 3
rd
 person mapping, F(1,46) = 6.98, p = .01, 2p = .13. Participants that viewed 
anatomically matching actions in the 3
rd
 person perspective made more hits when viewing 
grasps compared to misses, t(23) = 2.52, p = .019, but not participants that viewed mirror 
images. However, this effect was not relevant for the key research question.  
 
 
Discussion 
Actors constantly predict the consequences of their own actions, based on an integration of 
action and object information (Johansson & Flanagan, 2009). The present study revealed that 
a similar integration happens during action observation. Participants reported tactile 
stimulation on their own fingers while watching hands grasp or not grasp painful or neutral 
objects. We found that tactile stimulation was detected more quickly when participants 
simultaneously viewed actions with painful consequences, compared to actions that did not 
cause pain. This happened even though sensory action consequences were not task relevant, 
and no direct cues to pain were given. Our data therefore reveal that sensory consequences 
are predicted “on the fly” during action observation, and – similar to action execution – 
emerge from a combination of object knowledge (whether it causes pain) with information 
about the observed action (whether it makes contact with the object), rather than from either 
of these aspects alone. 
Importantly, this specific effect of observing action with painful consequences was 
restricted to the 1
st
 person perspective, where the visual input matches the input one would 
receive from one’s own actions. In the 3rd person perspective, the typical perspective we have 
on the actions of others, tactile responses only showed the more basic effects of whether the 
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hand generally made contact with the object (irrespective of whether the object was painful), 
and whether the object was generally painful (irrespective of whether it was touched). In 
contrast to the 1
st
 person perspective, the two aspects were not combined to predict the 
sensory consequences of the actions. These differences emerged even though the visual 
stimulation was identical in both conditions (i.e. the images were merely mirrored), and 
overall reaction times did not differ.  
Our data therefore reveal that the 1
st
 person perspective, but not the 3
rd
 person 
perspective, provides privileged access to mechanisms that predict an action’s sensory 
consequences by combining action and object knowledge. This finding challenges theories 
that assume that sophisticated shared representations of self and other emerge from specialist 
brain networks that have evolved to support the understanding of the actions of others (rather 
than the actions of oneself). Without further assumptions, such theories predict stronger 
effects in 3
rd
 person settings. This is the typical viewpoint from which the actions of others 
are observed and therefore presents the adaptive challenge for which such mechanisms 
should be specialized (cf. Ramachandran & Oberman, 2008; Schütz-Bosbach, et al., 2006). 
Instead, our findings are in line with the idea that sensory predictions emerge from basic 
mechanisms that have evolved for monitoring the observer’s own actions. The primary 
purpose of such mechanisms is predicting the consequences of these actions, such that 
negative outcomes are detected and course corrections can be made (Johansson & Flanagan, 
2009; Csibra, 2007; Kilner et al, 2007; Miall, 2003). As was found here, they should 
therefore be specifically tuned to actions from the 1
st
 person perspective, where the visual 
stimulation matches the typical input from one’s own actions, but less so for the 3rd person 
perspective, which captures the typical viewpoint on the actions of others. 
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As predicted, in the 1
st
 person perspective, anticipation of painful action consequences 
sped up tactile detection on the participants’ own fingers. This is consistent with the proposal 
that sensory consequences of others’ actions are represented in the observers’ own tactile 
representation systems. It specifically supports the view that somatosensory systems combine 
physical stimulation and stimulation predicted from the visual input in an additive manner, 
such that any response threshold can be reached more quickly when both are available 
(Morrison, et al, 2013; for evidence for a similar summation in the visual domain, see Roach, 
McGraw, & Johnson, 2011).  
The data are unlikely to reflect more general contributions of heightened attention or 
sped up motor responses. To explain the specific effect of painful grasps, even such general 
effects must result from a prediction of painful action outcomes, based on the integration of 
object and action knowledge (rather than from either factor alone). In addition, several 
findings support the view that the effects reflect changes in sensory-tactile systems. First, in 
our prior work that established the current procedure (Morrison et al., 2013), the effect of 
painful grasps was observed only for the detection of tactile – but not auditory – targets, 
ruling out a general attention/arousal interpretation of the effect. Second, fMRI data 
confirmed that the effect was specific to the somatosensory cortices, rather than other neural 
systems (e.g., relating to visual perception, or motor output). Third, in the current study, the 
RT distribution analysis (Supplementary data) ruled out a mere priming of fast responses (i.e. 
due to an alerting response). Together, these results support the notion that our 1
st
 person 
perspective effects indeed reflect a prediction of the sensory-tactile action consequences. 
An important question is how predictive models that arose for the control of one’s 
own action can account for effects of shared representation in 3
rd
 person perspectives, which 
have been observed in a variety of studies, and which may form one basis of social 
   
 
 
Bach, P., Fenton-Adams, W., & Tipper, S. P. (2014). Can’t touch this: The first-person perspective provides 
privileged access to predictions of sensory action outcomes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 40(2), 457-464.  doi: 10.1037/a0035348. 
 
 
understanding and empathy (e.g. Avenanti, et al., 2012). Our findings predict that, in the 
absence of biasing task factors, such effects should be restricted to basic components of other 
people’s action, such as whether an object is generally painful, or whether a hand makes 
contact or misses. More sophisticated effects may require tasks or stimuli that encourage 
perspective taking and therefore make the 3
rd
 person stimuli usable as input for 1
st
 person 
prediction processes. For example, our prior work has revealed sophisticated sensory-tactile 
prediction effects even though actions were presented in a 3
rd
 person perspective (Morrison et 
al., 2013). In that study, however, the participants were required to judge whether the action 
was appropriate to the object or not (grasping a painful object was inappropriate, and 
grasping a non-painful object was appropriate), a task that by itself biased participants to 
infer the actor’s sensations.  
Similar distinctions are also evident in the prior literature. Studies reporting automatic 
generation of shared representations in the 3
rd
 person perspective have typically used internal 
states that could be directly gleaned from the stimuli without requiring integration across 
sources of information. In the context of tactile processing, for example, studies have 
manipulated whether a body part was touched or not, without manipulating the type of object 
(e.g., Keysers et al., 2004; Schaefer, et al., 2009), or they varied the painfulness of an object, 
without manipulating whether it was touched or not (Meyer, et al., 2011). In contrast, many 
of the more sophisticated effects have been shown to be modulated by either encouraging or 
disrupting perspective taking. For example, automatic imitation (e.g. Brass, Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000) is disrupted if participants are made aware that the stimuli are 
virtual and do not belong to a sentient agent (Longo & Bertenthal, 2009), but is enhanced by 
prior social interaction (Hogeveen & Obhi, 2012). Pain empathy and prediction of others’ 
future behavior only engages self-related brain areas when the observed people were similar 
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to the participants or belonged to the same social group (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2006; Avenanti, 
Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010). Finally, an important modulatory factor is relevance for one’s own 
action planning. The curvature of an observed reach over an obstacle only affected the 
observers’ reach when the two actors shared a workspace (Griffiths & Tipper, 2012) or when 
the viewed action was in the observer’s own peripersonal space (Griffiths & Tipper, 2009). 
Thus, together, these observations are in line with our findings and suggest that deriving 
sophisticated shared representation of other people’s internal states from a 3rd person 
perspective is not automatic, but depends on a motivation for perspective taking.  
 
Conclusions 
Shared representations have been demonstrated for almost all aspects of others’ internal 
states, and they have been shown to form a basis of social understanding and empathy, but 
the origin of these mechanisms – and the boundary conditions for their activation – are still 
unclear. Here, we found that automatic predictions of the tactile-sensory consequences of 
others’ actions only occurred in the 1st person perspective, suggesting a specific role for 
mechanisms predicting the outcome of ones’ own actions. In contrast, our data suggest that 
the prediction of sensory action consequences in 3
rd
 person perspectives is under cognitive 
control, and may only happen when perspective taking promotes deeper encoding of the 
actions.  
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Supplementary Material 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Example images from the 28-item rating scale questionnaire. 
Participants first saw the image of the object from a typical viewing perspective to ensure 
they recognized the object when it was viewed from the less familiar birds-eye view.  The 
rating was made during the second frame, where the object was shown from a bird’s eye 
perspective.  
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Robustness analysis and sensitivity to the inclusion of the 3
rd
 person mapping factor 
 
None of the critical main effects or interactions – action, object, action X object, action, 
viewpoint X action X object – was qualified by the between-participants factor of 3rd person 
mapping (whether participants viewed the actions in the 3
rd
 person perspective as a mirror 
image or as an anatomical match), F < 1, for all. Moreover, the results were statistically 
identical when this factor was omitted from the ANOVA model, both for the omnibus 
ANOVA (relevant three way interaction of object, action and perspective, F(1,47) = 6.22, p = 
.016), and for the relevant two-way interactions of action and object, which is present in the 
1
st
 person trials, F(1,47) = 7.65, p = .008), but absent in the 3
rd
 person perspective trials, 
F(1,47) = 0.11 p = .737. The lack of sensitivity to the inclusion/exclusion of the factor 
suggest that our results are not driven by one perspective in particular, and that the mapping 
used for presenting the actions in the 3
rd
 person perspective has no measurable direct effect 
on the tactile detection times.  
To further verify that the effects are comparable across both mappings, we analysed 
the response time data separately for both groups of participants (Supplementary Figure 2, 
see Supplementary Figure 3 for the False Alarm data), those that saw mirror images or 
anatomical matches of the original actions in the 3
rd
 person perspective (n = 24, for each). 
Again, these analyses revealed little to no sensitivity of our results to whether the actions in 
the 3
rd
 person perspective were presented as an anatomical match or a mirror image. The 
relevant three-way interaction – indicating stronger integration of object and action 
information in the 1
st
 person than the 3
rd
 person perspective – was significant for the mirror 
image group, F(1,23) = 4.43, p = .047, 2p = .161, and showed a numerically identical pattern 
for the anatomical match group, even though this test failed to reach conventional levels of 
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significance, F(1,23) = 1.86, p = .186, 2p = .075. Indeed, there was no evidence for a 
difference between the effects for the two groups of participants, F(1,23) = 0.46, p = .503.  
In addition, despite the limited power, the critical two-way-interaction of action and 
object was found for both groups in the 1
st
 person perspective (mirror image, F(1, 23) = 3.61, 
p = .070, 2p = .14; anatomical match, F(1,23) = 3.89, p = .061, 2p = .15), but was absent for 
both groups in the 3
rd
 person perspective (mirror image, F(1,23) = 0.87, p = .360, 2p = .04; 
anatomical match, F(1,23) = 0.33, p = .572, 2p = .01), further confirming that our effects do 
not depend on how the 3
rd
 person actions were presented.  
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Supplementary Figure 2. Mean reaction time (ms) to the detection of a tactile stimulus, whilst 
observing hands from 1
st
 person perspective and 3
rd
 person perspective interact with painful 
and non-painful objects, for participants that saw anatomically matching images in the 3
rd
 
person perspective (top panel) and participants that saw mirror images in the 3
rd
 person 
perspective (lower panels). Error bars represent +1SEM.   
1st Person 
3rd Person 
Anatomical  
Match 
3rd Person 
Mirror Image 
1st Person 
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Supplementary Figure 3. Mean number of false alarms (erroneous detections) to the detection 
of a tactile stimulus, whilst observing hands from 1
st
 person perspective and 3
rd
 person 
perspective interact with painful and non-painful objects, for participants that saw 
anatomically matching images in the 3
rd
 person perspective (top panel) and participants that 
saw mirror images in the 3
rd
 person perspective (lower panels). Error bars represent +1SEM.   
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RT distribution analysis. 
We assumed, based on our prior work (Morrison, et al, 2012), that our RT effects reflect 
changes in the readiness to detect sensory stimulation, rather than a mere readiness to respond 
quickly to any sensory input when anticipating pain (i.e. a general alerting response priming 
fast movements). That is, our effects were specific to tactile detection and not observed when 
detecting auditory targets. To further support this notion, we analysed how the RT-effect 
developed over time, by assessing the size of the effect across response quartiles. General 
response priming accounts predict that any effects would be driven specifically by the faster 
responses (evidence for such an early effect, see, de Jong, et al., 1994), while a perceptual 
effect would predict an effect that stays constant or that develops over time.  
To disentangle these possibilities, we utilized the procedure of de Jong and colleagues 
(1994). For every participant, and each of the eight different conditions (Viewpoint x Action 
x Object), we split the data into four bins, ordered from the fastest 25% to the slowest 25% of 
responses. We then ran a four-way ANOVA with the factors Action (grasp, miss), Object 
(painful, neutral), Viewpoint (1
st
 person, 3
rd
 person), and Bin (1, 2, 3, 4). This indeed 
revealed a marginally significant four-way interaction of Action, Object, Perspective and Bin, 
F(1,47) = 3.09, p = .077). Supplementary Figure 4 plots this effect. Each line marks the two-
way-interaction effect of Action and Object for the two conditions in milliseconds, that is, the 
extent to which painful (relative to neutral) objects sped up tactile detection times when they 
were grasped compared to when they were missed. The difference between both lines 
therefore marks the 3-way interaction of perspective, action, and object in each bin.  
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Supplementary Figure 4. The size of the two way interaction of action and object in 
milliseconds across the four response quartiles (from the 25% fastest to the 25% slowest 
responses), for action seen from the 1
st
 person perspective (solid line) and action seen from 
the 3
rd
 person perspective (dotted line). Filled dots on each line mark effects at least 
marginally significantly different from zero in simple t-tests (p < .10). 
 
As can be seen, the effect indeed increases in the 1
st
 person perspective, but does, if anything, 
decrease in the 3
rd
 person perspective. Indeed, pairwise t-tests show that, for the first 25% of 
responses, the effect in both perspectives cannot be distinguished (p = .567). In the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 
bins, the differences just failed to reach conventional levels of significance (p = .077, p = 
.114 respectively). Only in the last bin, were significant differences found (p = .031). This 
shows that the differential effect of seeing grasps of painful objects in the two perspectives 
increases with response time. This is not consistent with the idea of a general alerting 
response that would prime participants to make relatively quick responses, but supports the 
notion of a perceptual effect that develops over time in the 1
st
 person relative to the 3
rd
 person 
perspective.  
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Signal Detection Analysis 
In contrast to Morrison et al. (2013), our present paradigm was not designed for a signal 
detection analysis and is not appropriate for it, for several reasons: (1) we used an above 
threshold task, so variability is low and there are too many cells with 100% hits and 0% false 
alarms. For a signal detection analysis, such cells have to be manually adjusted, which 
contaminates the data. (2) Typically, for signal detection analysis, 40 trials per condition are 
required, but we have only 28 stimulation trials per condition (35 in total). (3) The proportion 
of signal and noise trials is unbalanced (28 to 7), which further exacerbates the 
contaminations introduced by the manual adjustments.  
 Nevertheless, after the request of a reviewer, we ran such an analysis, and the results 
support the findings of our previous study (Morrison et al., 2013). We report the most 
important results here, but given the considerations above, they should be interpreted with 
caution. First, analysis of d-prime shows a significant Perspective by Object interaction, F = 
4.64, p = .037, replicating the effect shown in the false alarms, and indicating that people are 
less able to distinguish stimulation from no stimulation when painful objects are being acted 
upon in a 1
st
 person perspective. Second, the bias measure revealed a marginally significant 
three-way interaction of Object, Action, and Perspective, F = 3.44, p = .070. This reflects a 
higher tendency to report stimulation in the painful grasp condition in the 1
st
 person 
perspective only (similar to what was found for the RT data). This effect replicates our 
previous findings (Morrison, et al., 2012), where such an effect was predicted if the predicted 
sensory consequences and actually experienced stimulation would summate, leading to 
sensations of touch in the absence of stimulation (for similar effects in the visual domain, see 
Roach, McGraw, & Johnson, 2011). Consistent with this interpretation, in the original study, 
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this effect was absent in a control experiment where visual stimulation was identical but 
participants now had to detect auditory targets. 
 
